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Abstract. Access control is an issue of paramount importance in cyber-physical systems (CPS). In this paper, an access
control scheme, namely FEAC, is presented for CPS. FEAC can not only provide the ability to control access to data in
normal situations, but also adaptively assign emergency-role and permissions to specific subjects and inform subjects without
explicit access requests to handle emergency situations in a proactive manner. In FEAC, emergency-group and emergency-
dependency are introduced. Emergencies are processed in sequence within the group and in parallel among groups. A priority
and dependency model called PD-AGM is used to select optimal response-action execution path aiming to eliminate all
emergencies that occurred within the system. Fault-tolerant access control polices are used to address failure in emergency
management. A case study of the hospital medical care application shows the effectiveness of FEAC.
Key words: fault-tolerance, access control, cyber-physical systems, emergency management.
1. Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) is the integration
of computing, communication and storage capabili-
ties with monitoring and controlling the entities in the
physical world [ 1, 2, 3, 4]. The emergence of such
systems has effect on the revolution including high
confidence medical devices and systems, assisted liv-
ing, traffic control and safety, advanced automotive
systems, process control, energy conservation, en-
vironmental control, avionics, instrumentation, crit-
ical infrastructure control, distributed robotics, de-
fense systems, manufacturing, and smart structures [
5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. The security issues are crucial for CPS
applications because the entities within the systems
not only interact with each other, but also with the
physical environment, thus the security issues must be
addressed before CPS applications could be widely
deployed. Access control is an essential component
of CPS security to protect sensitive resources and ser-
vices from unauthorized access and qualify the be-
havior of entities within the system.
Existing access control schemes as RBAC, GR-
BAC, CAAC [ 10, 11, 12] are traditionally provide
access services in a passive manner, which need the
subject explicitly require the access. The access con-
trol polices of these schemes are statically defined be-
fore the application deployed, and cannot be adjusted
according to the change of system environment dy-
namically. Especially in emergency situation, tradi-
tional access control schemes cannot provide proper
privileges to execute the response actions to avoid the
failure of the system. In CPS application, physical
*Corresponding author; e-mail: f.xia@ieee.org.
environment is an import part of the whole system,
when making the access control decisions, the envi-
ronment context and the whole system context (not
only the context of access subject, but also the object
context and system states) must be taken into account.
In this paper, a new access control scheme called
FEAC (Fault-tolerant Emergency-aware Access Con-
trol) is proposed, which provides a proactive and
adaptive access control polices especially to address
multiple emergencies management problem and sup-
poses the fault-tolerant scheme for CPS applications.
PD-AGM (Priority and Dependency-Action Genera-
tion Model) is introduced to select the optimal re-
sponse action path for eliminating all the active emer-
gencies within the system, reference the methods in [
13] and [ 14]. The priority and dependency relation-
ships of emergencies are used to exclude the infeasi-
ble response action paths and relieve the emergencies
combination state explosion problem. In order to han-
dle all the emergencies timely, emergency-group and
emergency-role are introduced for parallelly process-
ing multiple emergencies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 introduces related work. Section 3
presents the primary concepts of emergency manage-
ment. Section 4 presents the FEAC scheme including
PD-Action Generation Model and access control pol-
icy. Section 5 gives the validation proof of the system
model. Section 6 presents a case study to demonstrate
the access control scheme. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
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2. Related Work
With the growth of pervasive computing tech-
nologies, researchers pay increasing attention to a
new area named CPS. Security is one of the most im-
portant problems that must be addressed in CPS ap-
plications [ 15, 16]. Much work has been done with
respect to access control for pervasive computing sys-
tems and other systems, which is a primary compo-
nent of system security.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [ 17] is one
of the most influential schemes for authorized access
information. Within an organization, roles are cre-
ated for various job functions. The permissions to per-
form certain operations are assigned to specific roles
without directly associated with subjects. RBAC pro-
vides an effective and easy way to enforce complex
access control policies. Different from RBAC, Con-
text Based Access Control (CBAC) [ 18] avoids the
notion of roles and directly associates permissions to
the subjects by the context information. Usage Con-
trol (UCON) [ 19, 20] combines the notions of access
control, trust management and digital rights manage-
ment to provide fine-grained access control to un-
known subjects. None of these schemes have the abil-
ity of privacy preservation when the system under
emergency situations. The access control polices runs
in a reactive manner and the explicit access require
from subjects is needed. The access control policies
of RBAC are static in nature and predefined before
deployment. Though UCON and CBAC have the abil-
ity to change the permissions available to subjects,
they only consider the change of the subject context,
which is too simplistic for CPS to manage the emer-
gency situations.
The Policy Spaces (PS) model [ 21] provides
adaptive emergency management. It divides polices
into groups and provides access privilege for spe-
cific situations. However, the PS works in reactive
manner in nature and cannot control the emergencies
within the system timely. Criticality-Oriented Access
Control (COAC) [ 22] firstly introduces the notion
of altering access control privileges to enable emer-
gency management for smart-spaces. The alternate
idea is to promote the role of specific subjects in the
space to execute response actions in a limited dura-
tion. COAC can only control the systems with single
emergency. Criticality aware Access control (CAAC)
[ 23, 24] expands the COAC scheme with a stochas-
tic modeling framework for evaluating the manage-
ment of multiple emergencies in smart-spaces. The
stochastic modeling framework provides a mecha-
nism for determining the response actions or deal-
ing with the stochastic nature of emergencies. CAAC
scheme presents a more proactive and adaptive man-
ner than other schemes.
Although the existing schemes play important
roles to guarantee the security requirement of CPS
applications in various degrees, designing a proactive
and adaptive access control is still a challenging is-
sue in CPS. In this paper, a new access control es-
pecially to address the emergency management prob-
lem and fault-tolerant problem for CPS applications
is proposed based on other relevant schemes. The ma-
jor differences between this work and the aforemen-
tioned schemes are as follows:
(1) PD-AGM model is introduced to select the
optimal response action path for eliminating emer-
gencies. The priority and dependency relationships
of emergencies are used to exclude the infeasible re-
sponse action paths and relieve the emergency com-
bination state explosion problem.
(2) The Influence-factor is employed to precisely
represent the influence between emergencies in the
group, which can help to generate the optimal re-
sponse action path. One emergency can influence
other emergencies in terms of the emergency-duration,
the probability of success and the execution time for
specific response actions.
(3) To guarantee the emergencies be processed
timely, the emergency-group and emergency-role are
adopted for parallelly processing the emergencies
within the system. Emergencies are grouped by the
entity they belong to. The emergencies in different
groups are parallelly processed, while the emergen-
cies in the group are processed in sequence.
(4) Role-mapping and constraints are proposed
for selecting proper subjects to execute specific re-
sponse actions. A hierarchical role structure is used
for selecting the most suitable subject.
(5) Fault-tolerant scheme is proposed for protect-
ing the normal running of the system by proactive al-
ternating permissions and services to substitute enti-
ties after the failure of emergency management.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some of the prin-
cipal concepts of emergency management used in
FEAC.
3.1. Emergency
Emergency is defined as the effect of series of
events in physical world [ 25], which can cause the
system goes into unstable states. These events are
called emergency events. The time duration for exe-
cuting some operations to restoring the system back
to normal state is called emergency-duration (Ed),
and the corresponding operations are called response
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actions for specific emergency within the system [
26]. In medical emergency, the time duration is called
golden-hour, during which the prompt medical treat-
ment can save life. If the emergency-duration has ex-
pired, the system will fail and cause the loss of prop-
erty and even life.
3.2. Emergency Management
Emergency management is designed to control
all the active emergencies that occur in the system,
to protect the sensitive information and to limit the
actions of the entities under emergency situations.
Emergency management enables response actions to
eliminate the active emergencies to avoid system fail-
ures in a proactive manner. Emergency management
for single emergency includes three phases which are
shown in Figure 1: Detection and Preparation, Re-
sponse, and Post-process. In the Detection and Prepa-
ration phase, the emergency is detected in a timely
manner in order to save time for executing the re-
sponse actions. The response action path is selected
after the detection of the emergency. Then in the Re-
sponse phase, the responses actions are performed
to eliminate the active emergencies. Emergency-role
and permissions for executing response actions are
assigned to the selected subjects. Finally in the Post-
process phase, the response actions are evaluated, and
the properties of the emergency may be updated if
necessary. The response action path and the selection
of the response actions might be changed for the next
execution.
In CPS, multiple emergencies may occur at one
time. Unlike single emergency management, multiple
emergencies management is more complex:
(1) The system not only needs to track the exe-
cution of the emergencies already existing, but also
needs to detect the occurrence of new emergencies.
(2) Multiple emergencies that occurred on the
same entity must be processed in sequence, and only
one emergency could be processed at one time. The
schedule for the process of multiple emergencies
should be considered.
(3) The execution sequence is influenced by the
dependency relationships between different emergen-
cies. Emergency-dependency exists between emer-
gencies that occurred on the same entity, and also be-
tween emergencies that occurred on different entities.
(4) Parallel process of multiple emergencies is
crucial for the performance of the emergency man-
agement.
3.3. Emergency-group and Emergency-dependency
According to the entity the emergency belongs
to, multiple emergencies are divided into different
t
Normal State
Detection and preparation
Response
Emergency
state 
TeTaeTasTs
Ts ?emergency start time
Tas ?response actions start time
Tae ?response actions end time
Post-process Te ?emergency end time
Fig. 1. Single Emergency Management
groups, named emergency-group. The emergencies
in different groups can be parallelly processed. In
FEAC, a specific environment emergency-group is
defined to specify the emergencies caused by the en-
vironment. The environment emergency affects other
emergencies in various ways. The affected emergen-
cies can be processed only when the environment
emergency is eliminated. Fire in the intensive care
unit (ICU) is an example of environment emergency.
In this context, other rescue actions for patients can
be deployed only when the fire under control.
Emergency-dependency is first introduced in this
paper. Emergency-dependency can reduce the states
of action generation model. In FEAC, the following
five kinds of dependency relationship are considered.
Definition 1. Entity-dependency. Emergencies are
divided into different emergency-groups according to
the entity each emergency belongs to.
Definition 2. Time-dependency. This dependency
relationship indicates the processing sequence be-
tween the emergencies within an emergency-group.
Definition 3. Environment-dependency. This is a
special dependency property of CPS applications.
In CPS, the computing system interacts with phys-
ical environment. Consequently, environment emer-
gency affects other entity emergencies. The depen-
dency relationship between entity emergencies and
the environment emergency is called environment-
dependency.
Definition 4. Resource-dependency. The resource-
dependency relationship indicates the competition
of certain resource. The emergencies in different
emergency-groups may have resource-dependency
relationship.
Definition 5. Subject-dependency. Some of the re-
sponse actions with respect to different emergencies
need the same subject to perform. One subject cannot
perform multiple response actions at one time.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of FEAC
To avoid dependency deadlock circle within a
group, we assign priorities to different emergencies,
and assume the time-dependency may exist only from
the emergency with higher priority to that with lower
priority. Thus the dependency deadlock circle can
be broken. The time-dependency affects the execu-
tion sequence in the group. The entity-dependency
determines the emergency-group of the emergencies
within the system. The last three dependencies exist
between groups, and affect parallel process of emer-
gencies. Subject-dependency conflict can be solved
by reselecting subjects for the emergencies.
4. Fault-tolerant Emergency-aware Access Con-
trol
Figure 2 depicts the schematic diagram of the
FEAC scheme for CPS applications. FEAC runs un-
der the normal state, emergency state and fault-
tolerant state. The transition happens with the di-
rection of arrow. When the emergency event occurs,
the system moves from normal state to emergency
state. When no emergency is active, the state moves
back to normal state. The failure in finding the opti-
mal response path in emergency management brings
the system to fault-tolerant state. If the failure is ad-
dressed successfully, the system turns back to emer-
gency state and continues emergency processing; oth-
erwise, the system goes to disaster state and disables
all services.
The constitution of FEAC structure is described
in Figure 3. The lower layer is the data layer, which
provides the data information for decision entity to
generate the access control decisions. The original
data include subjects (S), objects (O), permissions
(P), roles (R) and constraints (C) in core RBAC.
Additional data include context and constraint. Up-
per parts in data layer are abstract data and dynamic
data. ACMD (Access Control Meta-Data) abstracts
the relations between subjects, roles and correspond-
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Fig. 3. FEAC System Structure
ing permissions, and provides meta-data for other
units. CMU (Constraints Management Unit) provides
access control constraints for both normal state and
emergency state. DCMU (Dynamic Context Manage-
ment Unit) processes the context data that are col-
lected in the lower parts and provides higher level
contextual information for the components of deci-
sion layer. In decision layer, EMU (Emergency Man-
agement Unit) and FTU (Fault-Tolerant Unit) utilize
the data information provided by data layer, and in-
teract with RMU to handle the emergencies that oc-
cur within the system and generate appropriate ac-
cess control permissions. AMU (Account Manage-
ment Unit) records all the action events of the sys-
tem. ACPM (Access Control Policy Management)
performs the access control.
Initially, the administrator of the system estab-
lishes the set of roles, permissions and constraints
when the FEAC is deployed. Under normal state, the
permissions in the objects’ ACLs are used to make
access decisions. If necessary, entries are dynami-
cally added into the ACL according to the constraints
and contexts of subjects and objects. When the sys-
tem is in emergency state, FEAC uses PD-AGM to
evaluate the characteristics of the emergencies, select
the optimal response action path and response actions
and proactively activate the permissions. The selected
subjects are proactively informed to access the system
with the permissions assigned to the emergency-role.
4.1. Emergency Management in FEAC
The emergency management structure is shown
in Figure 4. ACMI (Access Control Meta-data Inter-
preter) and CCI (Constraint and Context Interpreter)
are the interfaces of meta-data, constraints and con-
texts information in data layer. Emergency event is
first detected by EDU (Emergency Detection Unit),
and then EPDU (Emergency Property Determination
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Fig. 4. PD-Action Generation Model
Unit) determines the properties, such as Ed and TS
(Task set) of the emergency. Most of the operations
are performed by EPU (Emergency Process Unit),
which uses the data information and emergency prop-
erties to schedule emergencies and execute the re-
sponse actions. The principal component of EPU is
PD-AGM, which is responsible for generating the op-
timal response action path and the response action for
the emergency. EPU interacts with other system com-
ponents through EMIU (Emergency Management In-
teraction Unit). ENU (Emergency Notification Unit)
informs the selected subjects of the permissions they
have been assigned. Each permission is associated
with a time duration to restrict the time period that
the subject can process the emergency.
4.1.1. PD-Action Generation Model
Action Generation Model (AGM) is first introduced
in [ 27]. It is an effective way to determine the re-
sponse actions for emergencies. In AGM, Response
Links (RL) represents the transitions that make the
system restore to the normal state. Stochastic crisis
planning technique developed in [ 28] is used in AGM
to model all the possible emergency states. Due to the
diversity of the emergency combinations, the state ex-
plosion problem remains an open issue.
PD-AGM is an extension of AGM and FDs[ 29],
which uses priority and emergency dependency for
response action path generation. PD-AGM can reduce
the number of emergency states of the system and re-
lieve state explosion problem. Figure 5 illustrates the
generation of the emergency state transition graph.
The solid line and the longer dotted line distinguish
the priority hierarchy and dependency hierarchy. The
shorter dotted line makes a distinction between dif-
ferent priorities in the dependency hierarchy. If the
emergencies have the same priority, the model uses
stochastic method to generate all the possible com-
binations. Each edge (RL) is associated with time,
TS, Ed and execution time of specific emergency. The
algorithm for state transition is described in Algo-
rithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Emergency state transition graph generation
Input:
Group of emergencies g;
Output:
Root node of emergency states transition graph t
1: Sorted the emergencies in group g by priority
2: for all emergency priority hierarchy do
3: Put dependency emergencies into the depen-
dency hierarchy
4: Remove them from corresponding priority hi-
erarchy
5: while dependency hierarchy is not Null do
6: Put dependency emergencies into higher hi-
erarchy
7: Remove them from corresponding priority
hierarchy
8: end while
9: end for
10: for all priority-dependency hierarchy do
11: Sort the emergencies by priority
12: end for
13: Set the root node t of the emergency states
14: for all sorted priority hierarchy do
15: Randomly generate state transition path, and
add it to the graph t
16: Calculate and set the edge properties as Ed and
execute time
17: Set the tail node of this hierarchy.
18: end for
19: Set the tail node as normal state and return the
root node t
4.1.2. RL path and Response Actions
The choice of the optimal RL path and response ac-
tions for the group of emergencies is crucial for the
emergency management. TS presents the set of re-
sponse actions which are used to mitigate the emer-
gency, denoted as < {a1, a2, ..., ak}, t, p >, where k
is the number of sub-actions, t is the execution time
of the set of response actions and p is the probabil-
ity of successful execution of the response actions. In
this paper, we select TS that has the highest proba-
bility of success and associate it with the correspond-
ing RL from the set of TSs. The RL is denoted as
< Eid, TS,Ed >, where Eid is the identity of the
emergency to be processed and Ed is the Emergency
duration for executing the set of response actions in
TS. Only when all groups of emergencies have been
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Fig. 5. State Transition of PD-AGM
eliminated, the system is considered to recover back
to normal state. The TS is affected by the probability
p and the available resources. We choose the TS with
the highest probability in the executable set of TSs.
The choice of RL depends on its P -value. The
definition of the P -value is as follows:
Definition 6. P-value. P -value is defined as the total
probability of successful recovery to the normal state
from current emergency state.
The P -value Pv(i) of current node i is calcu-
lated by (1) in a recursive manner:
y =


0 any Ed expired
1 normal state
maxj=1...k(p(i, j) · Pv(j)) childhood node
(1)
Here p(i, j) is the probability of reaching emer-
gency state j from state i. If the result of the P -value
on root node is not equal to zero, the path with the
largest P -value will be chosen as the optimal re-
sponse path. If more than one path has the same P -
value, the path with the shortest execution time will
be chosen. If the P -value is equal to zero, it indicates
that all the RLs cannot meet the time requirement of
emergency duration. Fault-tolerance is used to over-
come this problem by choosing substitution entity.
After fault-tolerance is performed, two heuristic se-
lection algorithms are used to minimize the lose of
property and life: one algorithm chooses the RL with
the maximum probability of successful transition to
normal state and the other chooses the RL with the
minimum execution time as the optimal response ac-
tion path.
The emergencies are not independent in the
group, and they interact with each other. The Influ-
Sensor node
Cluster  node
Substitute cluster  node
Cluster
Relay  node
Service
ACL
Role
Fig. 6. Example of fault-tolerance in FEAC
ence Factor σ is used to represent the influence be-
tween the emergencies. The corresponding definition
is as follows:
Definition 7. Influence Factor σ. Influence factor is
used to abstract the influence on the emergency by
other active emergencies in the group. Three proper-
ties are affected by σ: priority, execution time and Ed,
which can be calculated with the following equations:
p′ji = (1− σ)pji (2)
t′ji = (1 + α · σ)tji (3)
Ed′ji = (1− β · σ)Edji (4)
where α and β are the coefficients for execution
time and emergency duration respectively.
4.2. Fault-tolerance in FEAC
The fault-tolerance module always runs in a pas-
sive manner when the system crashed. In our scheme,
it executes in a proactive way by predicting failure
of the system. As mentioned above, when the P -
value is 0, it is implied that the emergency man-
agement fails to eliminate all the active emergencies
in the emergency-group. After the mitigation actions
have been processed, the system goes to disaster state.
FEAC employs another hierarchy to protect the sys-
tem using a fault-tolerant method.
Figure 6 gives an example of exchanging clus-
ter head node of wireless sensor network in order
to tolerate the damage of the cluster head node. The
scheme selects the proper node instead of the previ-
ous one, adds the entities in previous ACL to the sub-
stitute node’s ACL and assigns the roles of previous
one to the substitute one. The concrete algorithm for
achieving fault tolerance is illustrated in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm checks whether the entity could toler-
ate faults. When the result is false, and if there does
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not exist any substitute entity, the system moves to
disaster state and fails; otherwise, a substitute entity
will be activated to continue performing the jobs in-
stead of the original entity. The substitute entity is se-
lected from the EFGT (Entity Function Group Table),
which has the same function with the entity encoun-
tering the fault.
Algorithm 2 Fault-tolerance algorithm
Input:
entity e that needs to tolerate the fault;
1: if the property that indicates feasibility of fault-
tolerance is false then
2: exits and moves to Disaster state
3: else if se = findSubEntity(e) is Null then
4: return exits and moves to Disaster state
5: else
6: if getACL(e) is not Null then
7: for all entries in the ACL do
8: Add it to the ACL of se
9: Inform the subject that has activated the
role of the entity for the exchange of per-
missions
10: end for
11: end if
12: if getRole(e) is not Null then
13: Add the roles to the ASRT (Active Subject
Role Table) of se
14: Inform se of the permissions associated
15: end if
16: end if
4.3. FEAC Policy Specification
4.3.1. Emergency-role and Subject Selection
In FEAC, emergency-role is temporarily designated
to execute response actions which are not allowed to
operate by normal-role. In emergency state, the sub-
ject can be associated with only one emergency-role
because one subject can process only one emergency
at a time; otherwise, the time waiting for the subject
to finish performing the response actions will delay
the process of other emergencies, potentially causing
the emergencies uncontrollable. In addition, associat-
ing one subject with just one emergency-role is con-
venient for parallel process of the emergencies. The
minimum permissions are assigned to the emergency-
role in order to prevent damage from the execution of
malicious entities.
The method of emergency-role and role-constraint
mapping is used to hierarchically select the most
suitable subjects to execute the response actions.
In emergency-role mapping, each emergency-role is
mapped to normal-roles (one to many), and thus a hi-
erarchy structure is formed. The subjects of normal-
roles in the higher hierarchy are more suitable than
the ones in lower hierarchy as the subjects to execute
response actions. The constraints of the normal-role
in the emergency-role mapping are used to guarantee
the correctness of the subject selection, such as the
distance between the subject location, the place where
the emergency occurred, the number of the subjects
that can be associated with the emergency-role and
the properties of subject (experience, licenses and cer-
tificates).
4.3.2. Enabling Response Actions
When the response actions and subjects have been se-
lected, the next stage is to enable the permissions for
the subjects to execute the response actions, to notify
the subjects and to rescind the permissions when nec-
essary. It includes four steps:
(1) According to the RL and the selected response
actions, assign the corresponding permissions to the
emergency-role. The Ed of the emergency is associ-
ated with the permissions to limit the execution time
for the subjects to execute the response actions.
(2) Proactively alternate the emergency-role to
the selected subjects, and record the normal-roles for
recovery.
(3) Inform the chosen subjects to use the permis-
sions to execute the response actions for eliminating
the emergency.
(4) Rescind the assigned permissions after the
emergency has been solved or the Ed has expired.
4.3.3. Policy Implementation
Given the system structure of FEAC, this subsection
will describe the principal components of the access
control model and the policy implementation. Table 1
shows the set of the components in the access control
model, such as the notion of role, subject, object, per-
mission, ACL, emergency and constraint. Table 2 lists
the table components of the access control model.
SRT and ASRT store the roles that can be allocated
and activated for subjects. TDT and EDT are the ta-
bles of time-dpendency and environment-dpendency.
RMT and RCT are used to select the most appropriate
subjects to execute the response actions. The original
roles of the subject are stored in the ORT, and will
be reassigned when necessary. The entities have the
same function are grouped in EFGT.
Algorithm 3 illustrates the execution model of
FEAC, which works in a loop manner to mon-
itor the transition of system state. The function
checkSysState() checks the system state and re-
turns the current system state. If a change is de-
tected, then the system rescinds the pervious permis-
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Algorithm 3 FEAC execution model
1: selSubject← NULL
2: Mode← Normal
3: curState← N
4: while true do
5: t← checkSysState()
6: if t 6= curState then
7: if t = N then
8: Mode← Normal
9: else
10: Mode← Emergency
11: end if
12: RescPerm← (t⊗ curState)
13: curState← t
14: end if
15: if Mode = Emergency then
16: for all emergencyGroup do
17: if hasNewEmry(egid) 6= NULL then
18: PDAGM(egid)
19: pv ← getPvalue(egid)
20: if pv = NULL then
21: faultT olerance(egid)
22: if prob 6= 1 then
23: probF irstSel(egid)
24: else
25: timeFirstSel(egid)
26: end if
27: else
28: optimalSel(egid)
29: end if
30: end if
31: end for
32: curEmy ← findEmy(t)
33: if curEmy 6= NULL then
34: for all c ∈ curEmy do
35: er ← emyRole(c)
36: selSubject← roleMapSel(er)
37: if selSubject = NULL then
38: selSubject← roleConsSel(er)
39: end if
40: if selSubject 6= NULL then
41: TS ← getTS(c)
42: addACL(er, TS)
43: alterRole(selSubject, er)
44: informSub(selSubject, TS, er)
45: end if
46: end for
47: recordAct()
48: end if
49: end if
50: wait(tp)
51: end while
Table 1. Set Components of Access Control Model
Sets
Subject (S)
S = set of{< Sid, P t >}, where
Pt is the properties of the subjects,
Sid = unique < string >
Object (O)
O = set of{< Oid, ACL >},
where Oid = unique < string >
and ACL is the access control list
Role (R)
S = NR
⋃
ER, where NR
and ER are both set of {<
role >}, present the normal-role
and emergency-role respectively
Permission (P)
P = set of{< Oid, op, td >},
where td is the time duration limited
the use of permission
Access Control
List (ACL)
ACL = set of{< r, p >}, where
r ∈ R, p ∈ P
Emergency (E)
E = set of{<
Eid, TSs,Ed, Pro, e >}, where
Eid = uniqur < string >
, TSs = set of{< TS >}, P ro
is the priority, and e is the entity on
which the emergency happens
Constraint (C) C = set of< constraint >
Table 2. Table Components of Access Control
Model
Tables
Subject Role Ta-
ble (SRT)
SRT = set of{< s, rs >}, where
s ∈ S, ∀r ∈ rs, r ∈ R
Active Subject
Role Table
(ASRT)
ASRT = set of{< s, rs >},
where ASRT ⊂ SRT
Time Depen-
dency Table
(TDT)
TDT = set of{< Eid1, Eid2 >
}, where emergency with Eid1 exe-
cutes before the one with Eid2
Environment
Dependency
Table (EDT)
EDT = set of {< e,Eid >},
entity e dependents on the environ-
ment emergency with Eid
Role Mapping
Table (RMT)
RMT = set of{< er,X, cr >},
where ∀g ∈ X, g ∈ NR, cr ∈ C
Role Constraint
Table (RCT)
RCT = set of{< er, c >}, where
er ∈ ER, c ∈ C
Old Role Table
(ORT)
ORT = set of{< s, rs >}, where
s ∈ S, rs ⊂ ASRT
Entity Function
Group Table
(EFGT)
EFGT = set of {< e, FGid >
}, where FGid = unique <
string >
sions and sets the appropriate system state. When
the system is in emergency state, the system decides
whether to use fault-tolerance according to the P -
value. Functions probFristSel(), timeFirstSel()
and optimalSel() are chosen in different situation.
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Function findEmy() finds out the set of emer-
gencies that need to be processed. For each of the
emergencies in the set, the subject to execute re-
sponse actions is selected by function roleMapSel()
and roleConsSel() using RMT and RCT respec-
tively. Once the subjects have been selected, the sys-
tem assigns the corresponding permissions to the
emergency-role and informs the subject to use the
permissions. All the actions are recorded to ensure
any malicious activity can be detected. After these ac-
tions, the system waits for tp duration of time, and
repeats the whole process.
5. Validation of FEAC
FEAC should work in a proactive and adap-
tive manner in order to provide the right set of
permissions to the right set of subjects at right
time. In this section, we prove that the FEAC model
can meet the following properties/requirements: re-
sponsiveness, correctness, security, liveness and non-
repudiation.
Theorem 1. Responsiveness. FEAC ensures that
once an emergency occurs, the system will detect it
in time, assigns proper permissions, and informs the
selected subjects.
Proof. The FEAC model periodically detects the
emergencies as shown in Algorithm 3 on line 5. After
waiting for tp duration of time, the system calls the
function checkSysState() to get current state and
compares it with the previous one in order to detect
new emergency and change in system state. Lines 35
through 44 are used for subject selection, permission
association and subject notification. The role of the
subject is alternated by function altherRole() and
the permissions are added into the ACL by function
addACL().
Theorem 2. Correctness. Emergency-role can be
designated and the response actions can be executed
if and only if the system is under emergency state. Dif-
ferent path selection algorithms are processed in cor-
responding situations.
Proof. If the system is under emergency state, the
system mode changes to emergency mode, and the
value returned from function findEmy() is not
empty. Then the codes after line 33 in Algorithm 3
will be executed. The emergency-role will be desig-
nated and be assigned to the selected subject, then
the response actions will be performed. On the other
hand, if the emergency-role is designated, it means
that the condition is true and the system is in emer-
gency state. In this case, if the P -value is not 0, the
optimalSel() algorithm (line 28) is selected. Other-
wise, according to the value of prob, maximum prob-
ability path (line 23) or minimum execution time path
(line 25) is selected respectively.
Theorem 3. Security. The permissions assigned to
execute the response actions can only be used in
emergency mode. Fault-tolerance can only be pro-
cessed when emergency management fails.
Proof. When the system moves from emergency
mode to normal mode, the function rescPerm() will
be executed. The permissions and the subject’s role
will also be rescinded. The permissions for execut-
ing the response actions can never be used in nor-
mal state. When the P -value is 0 (line 20), function
faultT olerance() is called.
Theorem 4. Liveness. The time duration of the ac-
cess permissions are limited and the system must have
the ability to rescind the permissions when the emer-
gency is eliminated or the Ed is expired.
Proof. When the system state goes back to normal
state, the access permissions are rescinded. On lines
8 and 12 in Algorithm 3, the change of system state
is detected, then on line 12 the permissions are re-
scinded to satisfy security requirements.
Theorem 5. Non-Repudiation. Malicious actions
performed in emergency situations are restricted and
the subject cannot be repudiated.
Proof. The permissions for executing the response
actions are limited by the Ed of emergency. On line
47 in Algorithm 3, the recordAct() function records
all the actions performed in the system, such as the as-
signment of emergency-role and permissions, the ex-
ecution of the response actions and the notification of
the selected subjects. Once the malicious actions oc-
cur, the system will record them into the log files.
6. Case Study
In this section, we present an example to illus-
trate how FEAC can be used for CPS applications.
The case of hospital medical care shows the ability of
FEAC to handle multiple emergencies in emergency
situations. The emergencies which occurred in hospi-
tal medical care application are shown in Table 3. E1
and E2 are environment emergencies. E3 to E5 are
emergencies that occurred on patient 1. E6 and E7
are emergencies that occurred on patient 2. Figure 7
shows the PD-AGM for the hospital medical care ap-
plication. The generation of the emergency state tran-
sition graph uses the dependency relationships and in-
fluence factor in Figure 7. To simplify calculation, the
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Table 3. Emergencies in hospital medical care
ID Emergency prio Ed Task-Set (TS) Exec.Time prob
E1 Fire 3 20 min {< ICUDoor,< u >>,< F ireExtinguisher,< u >>} 3 min 0.8
E2 Dust and Smoke 4 10 min {< V entilationfan,< u >>,< ICUDoor,< u >>} 2 min 0.85
E3 Cardiac Arrest 6 8 min {< P1HealthData, < r&w >>,< Defibrillator1, < u >>
,< ICUDoor,< u >>}
1 min 0.8
E4 Headache 9 30 min {< P1HealthData, < r&w >>,< MedicineRoomDoor, <
u >>,< ICUDoor,< u >>}
1 min 0.9
E5 Fever 9 20 min {< P1HealthData, < r&w >>,< MedicineRoomDoor, <
u >>,< ICUDoor,< u >>}
2 min 0.95
E6 Arrhythmia 7 18 min {< P2HealthData, < r&w >>,< Electrocardiograph1, <
u >>,< ICUDoor,< u >>}
2 min 0.85
E7 Angina Cordis 8 12 min {< P2HealthData, < r&w >>,< ICUDoor,< u >>} 1 min 0.9
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0.85,2,18
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Role Mapping
Subject ID Role Old Role Context
ID1
ID2
ID3
ID4
ID5
ID6
E2 P1 DIC, Doctor busy, ICU
E3 P2 DIC, Doctor busy, ICU
E6 Nurse busy, ICU
Doctor - idle, hospital
P1 - E3, E4, E5, ICU
P2 - E6, E7, ICU
Subject Role and Context
Entity ID Entity Name
Function 
Group ID
ID7
ID8
ID9
ID10
...
Defibrillator 1 FG1
Defibrillator 2 FG1
Electrocardiograph 1 FG2
Electrocardiograph 2 FG2
... ...
Entity Function Group
Fig. 7. PD-AGM for hospital medical care
values of α and β are set to 1. The dependency be-
tween entity P1 and emergency E1 is environment
dependency. Environment dependency also exists be-
tween entity P2 and E1, as well as entity P2 and E2.
The emergencies in the emergency-groups of P1 and
P2 must wait the accomplishment of the correspond-
ing environment emergencies. Notice that, the two
path of state {4, 5} have the same P -value of 0.684,
and the corresponding execution time are 3.4min and
3.2min respectively. Then the right RL path is se-
lected.
The principal components of the FEAC for the
hospital medical care application are shown in Fig-
ure 7. All the normal-roles map to the emergency-
roles E1 and E2. Constraints for selecting subjects
include the position limitation and the number of exe-
cution. The role-constraints are used when no subject
has been selected. The original roles of the subject
are recorded, and reassigned when the response ac-
tions have been executed. The entries in ACL of the
objects influence the access control decisions for the
access request of specific subject.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a fault-tolerant emergency-aware
access control scheme called FEAC has been pre-
sented, which provides proactive and adaptive ac-
cess control polices to address the multiple emergen-
cies management problem and fault-tolerance prob-
lem for CPS applications. The PD-AGM model is in-
troduced to select the optimal response action path
for eliminating all the active emergencies. The prior-
ity and dependency relationships of emergencies are
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used to exclude the infeasible response action paths
and relieve the emergency combination state explo-
sion problem. In order to handle all the emergencies
timely, emergency-group and emergency-role are in-
troduced for processing multiple emergencies in par-
allel. FEAC can meet responsiveness, correctness, se-
curity, liveness and non-repudiation requirements. A
case study of hospital medical care application has il-
lustrated the effectiveness of FEAC.
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